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CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE
PRESS AND ITS SOURCES: COHEN v.
COWLES MEDIA CO., 111 S. Ct. 2513
(1991)
The First Amendment to the Constitution' protects the press against
state common law causes of action2 that directly burden the publica-
tion of truthful information.3 The United States Supreme Court sup-
ports an unfettered press4 and criticizes any state-imposed sanctions on
the exercise of free speech and press rights.5 However, this constitu-
tional protection is not absolute.6 The First Amendment does not
shield the press from laws of general application7 even if they burden
1. The First Amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. A state private common law cause of action is defined as a body of law that is
developed through judicial decisions, as distinguished from legislative enactments.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (6th ed. 1990).
3. It is unlawful for the state to punish a newspaper that legally obtains and pub-
lishes truthful information, "absent a need to further a state interest of the highest or-
der." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). A basic purpose of
the First Amendment is to limit a state's power to penalize the press for printing the
truth. See Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Pres" First Amendment Limitations
on News Source Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV.
1553, 1570 (1989).
4. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1560-62.
5. Id. at 1562. See infra note 26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
strict balancing test used by the Supreme Court to restrict limitations on the press' First
Amendment rights.
6. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1557. The Court's consistent recognition of tort actions
against the press indicates that there is no absolute privilege to publish all true informa-
tion. Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source
Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 609, 656-57 (1991).
7. A law of general application is one that does not single out or target the press,
but rather is applicable to all state citizens' daily transactions. Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., Ill S. Ct. 2513, 2515 (1991). Traditionally, the press has been subject to laws of
general application, including breach of privacy, trespass and unfair competition as well
as federal antitrust and labor laws. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103,
132 (1937) (holding that petitioner's business was not immune from regulation under
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speech incidentally.8 In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ,9 the United States
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not bar a promis-
sory estoppel claim against a newspaper that breached its promise of
confidentiality to an informant, even if liability would constrain the
newspaper's ability to gather and report the news.10
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., petitioner alleged that respondent
newspapers1" breached their confidentiality agreement, causing him to
§ 7 of the National Labor Relations Act simply because it was an agency of the press).
See also Levi, supra note 6, at 657 n.163.
8. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518. For a well-established line of cases holding that gen-
eral applicability laws do not violate the First Amendment, see infra note 28. See also
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977) (holding
that the press may not publish a performer's entire act without his consent unless state
law permits the press to do so under such circumstances); Citizen Publishing Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (stating that the First Amendment does not bar
the press from violating antitrust laws); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 192-94 (1946) (stating that the Fair Labor Standards Act, as applied to the
business of distributing and publishing newspapers, does not violate First Amendment);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (noting that the First Amend-
ment does not preclude application of antitrust laws).
9. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
10. Id at 2519. The Court determined that promissory estoppel is a law of general
application, rather than one aimed at the contents of a press publication. Id. at 2518-19.
As of 1990, only six other cases involving breach of reporter's confidentiality agree-
ments had been reported. See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp.
1289, 1298 (1. Minn. 1990) (stating that a confidentiality agreement between reporter
and source had to specify the unpublishable information to constitute a waiver of the
reporter's First Amendment rights), aff'd in part, 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991); Huskey
v. National Broadcasting Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (N.D. IM. 1986) (holding that
the media breached a contract with a federal penitentiary not to film inmates without
their consent); Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(ruling in favor of film maker who filmed conditions at a state correctional institution
because the plaintiff's claim of invasion of privacy was inconsistent with .defendant's
First Amendment rights); Doe v. American Broadcasting Cos., 543 N.Y.S.2d 455, 455-
456 (N.Y. App. Div.) (denying rape victim's claim of negligent and intentional infliction
of emotional distress arising from a television interview that assured anonymity, yet
resulted in recognition), appeal dismissed, 549 N.E.2d 480 (1989); Virelli v. Goodson-
Todman Enterprises, 536 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (noting that despite
the reporter breaking a promise of anonymity to his source, the media is not liable for
ordinary negligence when reporting a matter of public concern); Bindrim v. Mitchell,
155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App.) (holding that a contract between a therapist and
patient preventing the patient from writing a story about her therapy was not enforcea-
ble), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
11. The respondents are the publishers, not the individual reporters, of the St. Paul
Pioneer Press Dispatch and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, both Minnesota corpora-
tions. Cohen, II S. Ct. at 2516.
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lose his job.12 Relying on a promise of anonymity,13 Cohen gave docu-
ments relating to one of the gubernatorial candidates in an upcoming
election to reporters from two newspapers.14 Subsequently, respon-
dents broke their promise by publicly identifying Cohen as the anony-
mous source. 15  Cohen sued both papers for fraudulent
misrepresentation and breach of contract.1 6 The trial court ruled that
although petitioner alleged sufficient state action to implicate the First
Amendment, the Amendment did not bar his claims17 and the jury
awarded Cohen both compensatory and punitive damages.18 The Min-
nesota Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, conclud-
ing that petitioner failed to establish a misrepresentation claim.1 9 On
appeal, a divided Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
judgement in favor of Cohen, holding that the parties had not estab-
lished a legal contract.2" The court further held that the First Amend-
12. Petitioner Dan Cohen was the director of public relations for the advertising
agency representing the Independent-Republican gubernatorial candidate in the 1982
Minnesota election. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989). The advertising agency fired the petitioner the same day respondents published
Cohen's name as a source for a story concerning the candidate. Id. at 253.
13. Cohen made it explicitly clear to the reporters that he would provide the infor-
mation only on the condition that his identity remain anonymous. Id. at 252. Both
reporters agreed to fulfill this promise. Id.
14. Id. One week before the election, Cohen obtained two public court records
concerning Marlene Johnson, the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor. Id.
The records indicated that Johnson had been charged in 1969 for unlawful assembly
and convicted in 1970 for petit theft. Both counts were eventually dismissed. Id.
15. Id. at 253.
16. 445 N.W.2d at 254.
17. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the application of state
rules of law to restrict First Amendment freedom constitutes "state action" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., Ill S. CL 2513, 2517 (1991)
(citing New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)). See also Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (noting that action of state courts and judicial officers in
their official capacities is state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
18. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The
jury granted Cohen $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive dam-
ages. Id.
19. Id. at 260, 262. Without a misrepresentation claim, the court could not justify
awarding Cohen punitive damages. Id. at 260.
20. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990). The court
pointed out that although the press had an ethical duty to keep its confidentiality agree-
ment, no legal duty existed. Id.
1992]
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ment barred Cohen from maintaining a promissory estoppel claim.21
The United States Supreme Court reversed, declaring that Cohen could
maintain a cause of action under Minnesota law on a promissory estop-
pel theory.
22
Freedom of the press is a fundamental and compelling national in-
terest.23 State laws which effectively control the content of the media's
publications have been overwhelmingly struck down.24 Absent some
21. Id. at 203-05. The Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner
could maintain a promissory estoppel action under general Minnesota law. Id.
The three elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) an unambiguous promise; (2) an
expectation of induced action or reliance by the promisee; and (3) injustice that can only
be avoided by enforcing the promise. Id. at 203-04. The court held that although this
case satisfied the first two criteria, it was unwilling to conclude that injustice could be
avoided only by enforcing the promise. Id. at 204. By implementing a balancing test
the Court found that the constitutional rights of the free press outweighed the common
law interest in protecting a promise of confidentiality. Id. at 205. Thus, the court con-
cluded that a promissory estoppel theory would violate the respondent's First Amend-
ment rights. Id.
22. Cohen, I11 S. Ct. at 2518-20. The Court concluded that the First Amendment
does not confer a constitutional right on the press to disregard promises that would
otherwise be enforced under state law. Id. at 2519.
23. Kurt Hirsch, Note, Throwing the Book at Revelations: First Amendment Impli-
cations of Enforcing Reporters' Promises, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 161, 171
(1991).
24. See, eg., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan,
the Supreme Court "costitutionalized" the law of defamation in order to protect the
press' First Amendment rights. Id. at 283. Sullivan introduced the actual malice stan-
dard to libel law. Under the standard, persons requesting damages for libel must prove
that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the state-
ment was false or made with reckless disregard of its truthfulness. Id. at 279-80. This
landmark case made a drastic impact on tort remedies and expanded First Amendment
protections. See Hirsch, supra note 23, at 166-67. The case prompted further inquiry
by the Court into the category of plaintiffs that are subject to the actual malice standard
and the type of showing that is necessary to satisfy the new test. Id.
Additionally, the Constitution delimits a state's power to infringe upon the media's
"breathing space." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72. The Court explained in a subsequent
case that:
Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited
press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury... In our continuing
effort to define the proper accommodation between these competing concerns, we
have been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that
"breathing space" essential to their fruitful exercise. To that end this Court has
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974)(citations omitted). See also
Dicke, supra note 3, at 1560 (noting the Supreme Court's recent sensitivity to "the
chilling effect private common-law causes of action can have on the exercise of free
speech and press rights").
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higher state interest, a common law cause of action regulating the con-
tent of speech cannot predominate25 over First Amendment free-
doms.2 6 However, the First Amendment does not always bar state
restraints on the media's conduct. 27 The press should not be granted
special immunity from state laws of general application. 28 Because
such laws of generality do not single out the press, they do not offend
the First Amendment.2 9
25. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)(holding that absent
a legitimate and compelling state interest, the constitutional rights of the press
predominate). See also, Sally A. Specht, Comment, The Wavering, Unpredictable Line
Between "Speech" and Conduct The Fate of Expressive Conduct After Young v. New
York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), 40 WASH. U. J. URn. &
CONTEMP. L., 173, 176 (1991) ("Absent a compelling governmental interest, freedom of
expression must predominate.").
26. The Supreme Court has adopted a "compelling state interest" balancing test to
determine whether state action that has adverse effects on speech violates the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536-39 (1989) (noting that
the Florida statute which makes it unlawful to print or publish the name of a rape
victim violates press' First Amendment rights); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Min-
nesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1988) (a burden on First Amendment
rights "cannot stand unless the burden is necessary to achieve an overriding governmen-
tal interest") cited with approval in, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 256
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979)
(holding that the state may not punish the publication of lawfully obtained information
except when it is necessary to further a substantial state interest); Landmark Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978) (stating that the importance of
reporting governmental affairs outweighs a state statute imposing criminal sanctions for
breaching confidentiality of proceedings); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 496 (1975) (holding that state cannot impose sanctions on press for publishing rape
victim's name when information is open to public inspection).
The Supreme Court has also held that the First Amendment imposes limitations on
other common law causes of action, such as defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (stating
that freedom to publish advertisement parody trumps public figure's interest in reputa-
tion when false statement is made without actual malice or reckless disregard); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1964) (balancing the interests pro-
tected by defamation law against public interest served by a free press); see also Dicke,
supra note 3, at 1560-62 for further discussion of the Court's focus on the chilling effect
on free speech resulting from remedies for false statements.
27. This is true especially when a newspaper voluntarily assumes the restraint or
unlawfully obtains the information. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 204 n.6.
28. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91
(1972) (First Amendment does not relieve the press from the obligations that all citizens
have to respond to a grand jury subpoena); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103,
132-33 (1937) ("The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the appli-
cation of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of
others.").
29. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1560.
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The Supreme Court first became sensitive to the tension between
common law causes of action and the exercise of free speech and press
rights in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 30 In Sullivan, the Court held
that state enforcement of traditional strict liability defamation laws vi-
olated the First Amendment rights of the press.31 The court strength-
ened the defamation standard by requiring the plaintiff to prove that
the statement was made with actual malice.3 2 By constitutionalizing
defamation law,33 the Court hoped to give the press the proper
"breathing space" 34 to investigate news without fear of reprisal from
libel suits.3 5 The Court formulated a balancing test and held that the
public interest served by a free press outweighed the interests protected
by the law of defamation.36
The Supreme Court applied the Sullivan malice standard in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell37 by limiting actions for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.38 The Court in Falwell ruled against a public figure
defamed in an advertising parody, holding that damages were unwar-
ranted where the false statement was made without actual malice.39
The Court reasoned that, as long as the speech can be interpreted as
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. Id. at 283. Under the common law of defamation, one who published false and
defamatory material was strictly liable for damages, even without proof of actual harm.
RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 559 (1938).
32. 376 U.S. at 279-80. See supra note 24 for a discussion of the new standard.
33. See supra note 24 for a discussion of constitutionalizing defamation law.
34. 376 U.S. at 271-72.
35. Id. See also Hirsch, supra note 23, at 167 (noting that the Supreme Court
hoped to give the press space to investigate and report without fear of large damage
awards).
36. 376 U.S. at 284-85. Traditional strict liability standard may possibly lead to
media self-censorship. See Dicke, supra note 3, at 1576; see also Note, The Rights of the
Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1516 n.62 (1974)
(explaining that a fear of sanctions would discourage the press from acting on constitu-
tional guarantees).
37. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
38. Id. at 56. To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from advertisement parody, the plaintiff had to meet the Sullivan actual malice
standard. Id.
39. 485 U.S. at 56. Respondent, a well-known and outspoken minister, was por-
trayed in a magazine advertisement as a drunk and unscrupulous individual. Id. at 48.
Respondent filed a diversity action against the magazine and publisher to recover dam-
ages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at
48-49. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment for respondent. Id. at
57.
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stating actual facts without malice, the state's interest in protecting its
citizens from emotional distress does not outweigh the critical First
Amendment protection to speech.' Without meeting this require-
ment, the Court could not justify stifling the free flow of information
on matters of public interest and concern.4'
The Supreme Court continues to apply the balancing test enunciated
in Sullivan.42 For example, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,43
respondent newspapers revealed the name of a juvenile who allegedly
killed another youth.' Publication of a juvenile delinquent's name
without written approval of the juvenile court violated state law and
triggered punitive action against the news media.45 The Court invali-
dated the West Virginia statute because it punished the press for pub-
lishing lawfully obtained, truthful information.46 The Court held that
the State failed to demonstrate that criminal sanctions were needed to
further the state interest.47 The Court concluded that the interest in
protecting the identity of the juvenile offender does not outweigh the
press' right to publish publicly revealed information.
48
40. Id. at 52. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 761-63 (1985) (noting that not all speech is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 747-48 (1978) (stating that vulgar,
offensive or shocking speech is not entitled to absolute First Amendment protection).
The Court in Falwell, however, did not believe these exceptions applied to the facts of
this case. 485 U.S. at 56.
41. 485 U.S. at 56.
42. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1577.
43. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
44. Id. at 99. Information from seven different eyewitnesses lead to the arrest of a
14 year old boy who shot and killed his classmate in Junior High School in West Vir-
ginia. Id. The Charleston Gazette published the juvenile's name and picture in an arti-
cle detailing the shooting. Id.
45. W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976), construed in Smith, 443 U.S. at 98. Violators of
the West Virginia statute are fined up to one hundred dollars and/or confined to no
more than six months in jail. Id. § 49-7-20.
46. 443 U.S. at 105-06. Reporters obtained their information through witnesses, the
police and an assistant prosecuting attorney. Id. at 99.
47. Id. at 105-06. The State claims that publication of a juvenile offender's name
has an oppressive effect on the rehabilitation process. In the State's view, such exposure
stigmatizes the juvenile and leads to damaging consequences, such as anti-social con-
duct and jeopardizing future employment. Id. at 104. The Court rejected this argu-
ment, reasoning that criminal sanctions were not proper for this type of publication. Id.
at 106.
48. Id. at 104-06. See also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989) (noting
that when the government provides information to the media, a state's right to protect
individuals from press intrusion wanes); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
1992]
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The above-referenced cases illustrate the problems that states face
when enacting laws that define the content of publications. These deci-
sions, however, do not address the enforcement of general laws against
the press. When applying general laws to the press, courts apply a
lower level of scrutiny to the balancing test to expand press liability
and restrict constitutional protections. 49
Branzburg v. Hayes 50 illustrates the application of the lower level of
scrutiny. In Branzburg, a grand jury subpoenaed a news reporter to
identify his confidential sources. 51 A state court judge ordered the re-
porter to answer questions and rejected his First Amendment de-
fense.52 The Supreme Court held that journalists do not have an
absolute First Amendment right to withhold the identity of confiden-
tial sources from a grand jury.53 The Court reasoned that an absolute
reporters' privilege 54 would jeopardize defendants' rights to a fair
trial.55 The Court refuted the reporter's claim that this decision would
have a negative impact on his future ability to obtain news from credi-
ble sources. 56
491 (1975) (holding that states may not sanction the accurate publication of information
obtained from public records).
49. See Dicke, supra note 3, at 1577 nn.137-39 (requiring a showing of actual mal-
ice for plaintiff to recover for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress).
50. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
51. Id. at 668.
52. Id. The lower court also rejected defenses asserted under §§ 1, 2 and 8 of the
Kentucky Constitution and under § 421. 100 of the Kentucky reporters' privilege statute
which provides in part: "No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceed-
ing or trial before any court, or before any grand or petit jury... the source of any
information procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper.. .with which
he is connected." KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
53. 408 U.S. at 708-09.
54. Neither the press nor an individual has a First Amendment privilege to refuse to
answer questions during a grand jury investigation. Id. at 690. Thus, the court finally
sets a place for state laws, which serve a substantial public interest, to be enforced
against the press and the public equally. See also Hirsch, supra note 23, at 206 (stating
that journalists lack the absolute privilege to withhold confidential sources from a grand
jury).
55. 408 U.S. at 690. Powell's concurrence stresses balancing the state interest in an
effective grand jury system against First Amendment protections. Id. at 709-10.
56. Id. at 682-84. In his dissent, Justice Stewart emphasized that "news must not
be unnecessarily cut off at its source" and that the right to gather news should not be
compromised. Id. at 728. However, Justice Powell stressed in his concurrence the lim-
ited nature of the Court's holding, stating "[t]he Court does not hold that newsmen,
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect
to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources." Id. at 709. Justice Powell
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol41/iss1/9
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In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,57 the Supreme
Court again refused to confer on the media immunity from generally
applicable laws. The Zacchini Court held that a television station was
not privileged to film a private performance without the consent of the
individuals involved. 8 The Supreme Court overruled the Ohio
Supreme Court's holding that, absent an attempt to harm or injure, the
media is constitutionally privileged to report matters of public inter-
est.5 9 The Court explained that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not privilege the media to violate an individual's right of publicity
guaranteed by state law.'
Recently, however, the United States District Court for Minnesota
extended to the press First Amendment protection against suits for
breach of confidentiality. In Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publication, Inc.,61
the court followed a three-step analysis 62 to determine whether the
suggested that certain confidentiality agreements may be enforceable depending on the
circumstances. Id. at 710. For example, if the confidential information is only remotely
related to the investigation, Powell stated that the reporter may be able to petition the
court for a protective order. Id.
Several courts have addressed the concern of whether potential sources would "dry
up" if reporter-source agreements were unenforceable. See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast
Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1299 (D. Minn. 1990) ("[S]ources will not be
willing to rely on reporters' promises of confidentiality if no remedy exists for breach."
(citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)); see
also Hirsch, supra note 23, at 208 (questioning whether it would be correct to protect
confidential sources from subpoena and yet allow the press to break its promise of confi-
dentiality whenever it chooses).
57. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
58. Id. at 578-79. Petitioner, an entertainer with a human cannonball act, sued a
television station for filming his performance without his consent. Id. at 562.
59. Id. at 578-79. In his dissent, Justice Powell stated that the public will be the
"loser" if such harsh restriction is placed on the media. 433 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 578-79.
61. 733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn. 1990), aff'd in part, 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991).
62. Id. at 1295. The three-step analysis used for breach of confidentiality contracts
begins by questioning, first, whether any state action is present to implicate First
Amendment scrutiny, and second, whether the media waived its First Amendment
rights by entering into the contract. Id. If the answer to both questions is affirmative,
the contract is enforceable. Id. If the contract lacks one or both of the first two criteria,
however, the court proceeds to a third step in which it applies a compelling state inter-
est balancing test to weigh competing interests of the state and the press. Id. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 257 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989), applied the Ruzicka balancing test. The Supreme Court declined, how-
ever, to follow the balancing test in Cohen, relying instead on the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2517 (1991).
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First Amendment protects the media from breach of contract ac-
tions.6 3 The court concluded that due to the particular facts of the
case," the confidentiality agreement between the reporter and source
was too vague to be enforceable.6 5 Moreover, the court stated that oral
contracts raise serious problems of proof66 and create the potential for
expensive and vexatious litigation.67 Consequently, the Supreme Court
will not abridge constitutional rights of the press unless there is unam-
biguous proof that a contract was formed and that the infringement is
incidental in nature.68
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 69 presented the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to balance the First Amendment against contract law.7°
In Cohen, the Court held that the plaintiff could enforce a newspaper's
breach of a confidentiality agreement through promissory estoppel.7 1
The Court determined that recovery under the promissory estoppel
63. 733 F. Supp. at 1295.
64. Plaintiff was interviewed by a reporter for an article about sexual abuse by ther-
apists. Id. at 1290. Plaintiff consented to the interview subject to the condition that she
would not be identified or identifiable and the reporter agreed to this condition. Id. at
1291. The Court held that since plaintiff did not specify what particular facts would
threaten her anonymity, the contract was too ambiguous to be enforced. Id. at 1300-01.
65. "IT]he Constitution requires plaintiffs in contract actions to enforce a reporter-
source agreement to prove specific, unambiguous terms and to provide clear and con-
vincing proof that the agreement was breached." Id. at 1300.
66. Id. See also, Dicke, supra note 3, at 1570 ("[I]mprecision and the oral nature of
many confidentiality agreements raise serious problems of proof.").
67. 733 F. Supp. at 1300. See also Dicke, supra note 3, at 1571 n.102 (stating that
examples of vexatious litigation include suits which look to punish, intimidate and har-
ass the media instead of looking to "seek compensation for actual injury").
68. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1573 & n. 116. Ruzicka did not raise a promissory estop-
pel claim at the district court trial; however, she did invoke an estoppel claim on ap-
peal. Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1991). On
review, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that promises of confidentiality be-
tween journalists and sources do not constitute a legal contract under Minnesota law.
Id. at 582. Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Cohen, however, the Eighth
Circuit allowed Ruzicka to raise a promissory estoppel claim. Id. at 583. The court
remanded the case to the District Court to consider whether a promissory estoppel
claim is a viable theory of recovery under Minnesota law. Id.
69. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
70. For an in-depth discussion of balancing the First Amendment and contract law,
see Hirsch, supra note 23, at 193-202.
71. 111 S. Ct. at 2516. This conclusion ignores the Minnesota Supreme Court's
finding that the newspapers' promises to keep Cohen's identity confidential were not
enforceable under the promissory estoppel doctrine. 457 N.W.2d at 205.
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theory constituted state action,72 triggering First Amendment protec-
tion.73 The Court also noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
is a generally applicable law which does not offend the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of the press.74 The Court concluded that the
Minnesota Supreme Court should readdress petitioner's promissory es-
toppel claim as a viable theory for recovery.75
The Cohen Court also determined that applying the state promissory
estoppel doctrine does not inhibit truthful reporting.76 The Court rea-
soned that respondents obtained petitioner's name by breaching its
promise, thereby making the acquisition unlawful.77 Thus, while the
purpose of the First Amendment is to protect and encourage journal-
ists to report news of public interest, it does not confer a constitutional
right to disregard contractual promises.73
In dissent, Justice Blackmun urged that the majority's reliance on
the line of cases addressing enforcement of generally applicable laws
was misplaced. 79 Concluding that the Sullivan line of decisions con-
trolled,'o Blackmun emphasized that whenever state law attempts to
penalize free expression, the state interest must be compelling to with-
stand the strictures of the First Amendment.81 In a separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Souter reiterated the argument that laws of general
72. Id. at 2517-18. See supra note 17 for a description of "state action."
73. 111 S. Ct. at 2517-18. The Supreme Court rejected the Ruzicka court's balanc-
ing test, emphasizing that the press voluntarily entered into the confidentiality agree-
ment. Id. at 2519. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Ruzicka court's balancing approach.
74. 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19. See also supra note 7 for an explanation of a law of
general application.
75. 111 S. Ct. at 2519-20.
76. Id. at 2519.
77. Id. The Court distinguished this case from Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524
(1989) where a rape victim's name was lawfully obtained through public records. Id.
78. Id.
79. 111 S. Ct. at 2520-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In the dissent's view, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's decision was premised "not on the identity of the speaker, but
on the speech itself." Id. at 2520. Accordingly, under Justice Blackmun's reasoning,
state law did not afford special immunity to the press and, consequently, reliance on the
general law cases was inappropriate. Id. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the line of cases interpreting application of the general laws.
80. Id. at 2521. The dissent regarded the Falwell decision as directly on point. Id.
See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Falwell decision.
81. Id. at 2522.
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applicability were not dispositive in the case. 2 Justice Souter stated
that the proper approach was to balance the State's interest in enforc-
ing the newspaper's promise of confidentiality against the press' First
Amendment rights.8 3 The dissenting opinions concluded that the
State's interest was not compelling, and could therefore not survive
First Amendment scrutiny. 4
The Cohen majority correctly reversed the Minnesota Supreme
Court's holding85 and properly applied the line of cases that refuse to
grant reporters a special privilege denied to other citizens.8 6 The Court
has consistently prohibited states from enacting laws that directly in-
fringe upon the rights and privileges of the press.8 7 The Cohen deci-
sion, however, involves a state-law that was not intended to single out
news reporters' conduct.88 Application of such a general law must be
applied with an even hand.89 To allow the press to hide behind a shield
of confidentiality when they have broken the law would be
unconscionable. 90
Moreover, the Cohen decision does not take away any established
legal right of the press." Confidentiality agreements inherently re-
strain editorial freedom to publish what media institutions have
82. 111 S. Ct. at 2522 (Souter, L, dissenting). Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Sou-
ter concluded that the Sullivan line of cases controlled. Id.
83. Id. at 2522-23. Justice Souter's dissent rejected the majority's position that bal-
ancing was improper because the newspapers voluntarily entered into the confidentiality
agreements. Id.
84. Id. at 2522-23.
85. Unlike the Minnesota Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that the rationale which justifies protecting the media in defamation actions is
not applicable to breach of confidentiality agreements. 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
86. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text discussing cases in which the
court held that general laws apply to the press.
87. See supra notes 30-47 and accompanying text discussing cases in which the
court held that state interests did not outweigh freedoms of the press.
88. See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text illustrating the conflicts between
general applicable laws and the press' First Amendment rights.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 111 S. Ct. at 2518. The Court stated that:
Generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and
reports the news... Neither does the First Amendment relieve a newspaper re-
porter of the obligation shared by all citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena
rdJ .
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learned.92 The agreements represent self-imposed restraints that
members of the press have voluntarily promised not to breach.93 Ac-
cordingly, legal enforcement of the promissory estoppel theory is in the
best interest of both the public and the press.
As a matter of general welfare, if the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press continues to grow without restrictions, certain
individual rights will suffer. The privilege to form a contract and ex-
pect it to be upheld should be appreciated by every person and institu-
tion in society. Accordingly, the Cohen decision should not be viewed
as a limitation on First Amendment privileges but as a necessary step
to ensure the protection and enforcement of every individual's legal
and fundamental rights.
Susan S. Greenebaum*
92. Dicke, supra note 3, at 1569.
93. Id. See supra note 27.
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